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ABSTRACT: From the classical gold standard up to the current ERM2 arrangement 
of the European Union, target zones have been a widely used exchange regime in 
contemporary history. This paper presents a benchmark model that rationalizes the 
choice of target zones over the rest of regimes: the fixed rate, the free float and 
the managed float. It is shown that the monetary authority may gain efficiency by 
reducing volatility of both the exchange rate and the interest rate at the same time. 
Furthermore, the model is consistent with some known stylized facts in the 
empirical literature that previous models were not able to produce, namely, the 
positive relation between the exchange rate and the interest rate differential, the 
degree of non-linearity of the function linking the exchage rate to fundamentals and 
the shape of the exchange rate stochastic distribution. 
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De la Elección de un Régimen Cambiario: un retorno a 
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RESUMEN: Desde el patrón oro clásico hasta el actual mecanismo de tipos de 
cambio ERM2 de la Unión Europea, las zonas objetivo han sido los acuerdos 
cambiarios más utilizados en la historia contemporánea. Este trabajo presenta un 
modelo que racionaliza la elección de las zonas objetivos sobre otro tipo de 
acuerdos: tipos de cambio fijos, de flotación libre y de flotación sucia o dirigida. El 
trabajo demuestra que una zona objetivo puede proporcionar una mayor eficiencia 
reduciendo, al mismo tiempo, la volatilidad tanto del tipo de cambio como del tipo 
de interés. El modelo es, además, consistente con ciertos hechos observados de la 
literatura empírica y que anteriores modelos eran incapaces de reproducir, a saber: 
la relación positiva entre el tipo de cambio y el diferencial de tipos de interés, la 
forma no lineal de la función que relaciona al tipo de cambio con sus fundamentos 
de mercado y el perfil formal de la distribución estocástica del tipo de cambio. 
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This paper tackles the question of the choice of an exchange regime, with a special
focus on target zones. During the nineties, a large amount of literature analyzed
a variety of issues regarding target zones, both from a theoretical perspective
(i.e. mainly the properties of the model proposed by Krugman [15] and of its
variants) as well as from an applied point of view (i.e. mainly the crisis of the
European Monetary System). The creation of the European Monetary Union led
exchange rate researchers to move their interests to other questions apart from the
ones proposed by the target zone literature. Yet, we believe there are still useful
insights to be learnt on target zones. The reasons why we persist are threefold:
1. Target zones have been the predominant exchange rate agreement in the
world throughout contemporary history. Some recent analyses have reclas-
siﬁed exchange rate regimes focusing on what countries actually do rather
than on what they say they do (see Calvo and Reinhart [6], Reinhart [23],
Reinhart and Rogoﬀ [24], Fischer [8] and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
[17]). This implies a distinction between de jure and de facto typologies.
De jure examples of target zones are numerous: the interwar Gold Stan-
dard, the postwar Bretton Woods regime, the European monetary snake
of 1971, the European Monetary System (EMS) from 1978 to 1998, or the
unilateral target zone of Sweden from August 1977, among others. On the
other hand, the number of de facto examples of target zones is much larger.
The aforementioned literature has stressed the fact that many of the de jure
free ﬂoaters strongly intervene to soften the ﬂuctuations of the nominal ex-
change rate. This has been labeled as fear of ﬂoating. The recent de facto
classiﬁcation of Reinhart and Rogoﬀ [24] conﬁr m st h a tm o s to ft h em a j o r
currencies are traded in an international exchange market characterized by
bands of ﬂuctuations (see their Appendix III). According to these authors,
“...the most popular exchange rate regime over modern history has been
the crawling peg or narrow crawling ba n d ,w h i c ha c c o u n t sf o ro v e r2 6p e r -
cent of the observations”. In the Western Hemisphere, this accounts for
about a 42 percent of the observations. Their sample consists on market-
determined paralell exchange rates observations of 153 countries from 1946
through 2001.
2. Target zones shall probably be an important exchange rate agreement at least
in the nearby future. As an example, consider the ERM2 which, from Jan-uary 1st 1999, is working as a “hub-and-spokes” zone between the euro and
those currencies of the European Union countries not participating in the
Monetary Union (United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden). Also, accession
countries to the European Union shall commit to a target zone arrangement
during the transition period. Again, many other de facto examples could
be quoted.
3. Any exchange rate regime can be seen as a special case of a target zone.
Pegged rates can be seen as target zones with band widths equal to zero
and pure ﬂoating rates are equivalent to ﬂuctuation bands with an inﬁnite
width. In between, dirty ﬂoats can be seen as implicit target zones with
ﬁnite bands while target zone regimes impose those bands explicitly. The
choice of an exchange regime then consists on deciding how wide should
the bandwidth be. It must be clear that we will not try to give a typology
of exchange regimes alternative to the ones given by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ
[24] or by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger [17]. Instead, what we do is to
construct a general model able to represent any exchange agreement. By
doing so, we can rationalize such a choice.
The need of a more formal target zone model becomes more important given
that the extreme regimes (i.e. the ﬁxed rate and the ﬂexible rate) are only stan-
dard textbook cases. While Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ [22] predicted a world of widely
ﬂoating exchange rates, given the removal of controls to international capital mo-
bility, the fear of ﬂoating literature has pointed out that countries reveal a prefer-
ence towards smoothing the dynamics of the exchange rate. Intermediate regimes
seem to be deﬁning the current world so that completely ﬁxed or fully ﬂexible rates
(see Fischer [8]) are seldom observed. Pure ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t er e g i m e sa r er a r e l y
used since they compromise a large amount of monetary independence. A mone-
tary commitment that pegs the exchange rate to a low inﬂation foreign currency
can establish a disciplining eﬀect that motivates a higher degree of credibility and
price stability (see Giavazzi and Pagano [12]). However, given the evidence on the
choice of currency regimes by central banks, it seems that the gains from stability
of ﬁxed exchange rates have not been big enough to dampen the losses from less
monetary independence (see Svensson [30] for a detailed discussion). On the other
hand, pure free ﬂoating regimes are not observed either. Monetary authorities use
to play leaning against the wind policies in an attempt to control the exchange
rate around some target level, oﬃcial or unoﬃcially. Thus, it seems that hybrid
exchange regimes based on target zones have been widely used on the basis that
2it apparently reaps the beneﬁts of both ﬂexible and ﬁxed exchange rates.
Krugman [15] presented the model that has become the standard tool to study
target zones regimes. The dynamics of the exchange rate were derived from a
linear asset pricing relation and an arbitrage condition given by the uncovered
interest rate parity. His model assumed that the central bank intervenes so as
to maintain the exchange rate within the band. In this paper, we look at two
issues. First, we extend Krugman’s model in two directions: (i) we allow the
central bank to perform intramarginal interventions, that is, to use its monetary
policy to aﬀect the exchange rate before it hits the limits of the band and, (ii) we
introduce lack of credibility of the target zone, that is, the perception by market
participants of the possibility that the central bank will not defend the band when
it has to. Unlike the literature following Krugman’s work that has concentrated
on one of these extensions at a time, we show that both features are needed in
order to reconcile the model with data. As a second issue, we use the model to
rationalize the choice of target zones over the rest of regimes: the ﬁxed rate, the
free ﬂoat and the managed ﬂoat. It is shown that, by imposing a target zone, the
monetary authority may gain eﬃciency through reducing volatility of both the
exchange rate and the interest rate simultaneously.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the general model. Sub-
s e c t i o n s2 . 2t o2 . 4s h o wh o wt h eﬁxed rate, the managed ﬂoat and the free ﬂoat
can be seen as extreme cases of a target zone. Section 2.5 develops the target
zone solution. Section 3 deals with the two questions outlined in the previous
paragraph. The last section concludes.
2. Set up of the Model
2.1. General assumptions
The model represents a highly stylized dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
economy. It can be thought of as a reduced form version of more complicated
fully optimizing models. Time is discrete. First, consider an equation specifying
equilibrium in the money market:
mt − pt = ϕyt − γit + ξt, (2.1)
where mt is money supply, pt is the domestic price level of yt, a tradable good,
it is the domestic interest rate of a one period of maturity bond, and ξt is some
shock to money demand. They are all expressed in logs, with the exception of
3the interest rate. Parameters ϕ and γ are both positive: money demand increases
with output because of a transaction motive and there is an implicit liquidity
preference behavior, meaning that money can be a substitute for a bond that
returns a nominal interest it.
Let xt be the log of the nominal exchange rate, expressing the price of one
unit of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency. The (log) real exchange
rate is given by




t is the foreign price (variables with star will denote the foreign analogue).
Call dt ≡ it−i∗, the interest rate diﬀerential, where i∗ is the foreign (constant)
rate, and assume perfect capital mobility, risk aversion and the uncovered interest
rate parity condition (UIP)
dt = Et {xt+1 − xt} + rt, (2.3)
where Et is the expectation operator conditional on information available at time
t. Thus, the expected rate of depreciation must compensate for the interest rate
diﬀerential plus the foreign premium, rt. We assume the variable rt to be exoge-
nous and governed by a ﬁrst order Markov process
rt = rt−1 + εt. (2.4)
The white noise {εt} is supposed to be Gaussian, εt ∼ N (0,σ2), for convenience.1
Using (2.2), (2.3) and (2.1) one obtains
xt = ft + γEt {xt+1 − xt}, (2.5)
ft = mt + vt,
vt = θt + γrt,
θt = qt − p
∗
t − ϕyt + γi
∗ − ξt.
1The foreign risk premium plays a key role in the current paper. In general, the UIP does not
hold (see Ayuso and Restoy [1]). Conventional target zone models consider that deviations from
UIP are negligible in target zones (see Svensson [28]). A common practice in some credibility
tests of target zones relies in this idea (v.g. the simplest test, see Svensson [25], and the drift
adjustment method of Bertola and Svensson [5]). However, Bekaert and Gray [3] ﬁnd that the
risk premia in a target zone are sizable and should not be ignored. They argue that this might
be the reason of why the credibility tests run on EMS at the beginning of the nineties failed in
anticipating the 1992-93 turbulences.
4Total fundamentals ft amount to an endogenous process, mt, plus an exogenous
process, vt. By iterating forward on xt we have that








τEt {mt+τ + vt+τ}, (2.6)
with ν ≡ γ (1 + γ)
−1. The forward looking behavior from UIP implies that the
value of asset xt is the present discounted value of the future stream of funda-
mentals. Notice that (1 − ν)
P∞
τ=0 ντ =1 ,t h u s ,i fmt+τ were orthogonal to vt+τ
for all t and τ, the long run eﬀect of an increase in mt is to impulse xt by an
equal amount. We assume that both the central bank and traders can observe
the realization of θt and rt.
The monetary authority must choose the path for money {mt} so to maximize
its preferences subject to the evolution of {vt} and the exchange rate regime.
The objective is to set up these preferences to capture the degree of monetary
independence that arises under alternative exchange rate regimes. As in Svensson
[29], the concept of monetary independence is associated with the interest rate
variability. At one extreme, and in the absence of realignments, a ﬁxed rate
eliminates monetary independence. At the other extreme, a managed ﬂoat regime
provides the highest degree of independence. In between, a target zone gives some
s c o p et of o c u st h em o n e t a r yp o l i c yo nd o m e s t i cp r o b l e m s .T oc a p t u r et h i si d e a ,
the central bank (henceforth, CB) preferences are modeled to evaluate the trade-
















The long run desirable target for the interest rate diﬀerential is zero. The target
for the exchange rate is the central parity ct around which deviations are punished
by the relative penalty λ.T h ef a c t o rβ ∈ (0,1) is a time discount rate.
We think of a very short maturity term for the bond in the UIP, say a few
days, a week or a month at most. The idea is that the CB controls some monetary
aggregate {mt} to target {dt,x t}. Output realizations and real ﬂuctuations are
observed with some delay, and not available by the time monetary policy is decided
so the only available information at any period is {θt,r t}. From (2.3) and (2.5) it
is easy to show that mt will respond one to one to the shock θt and the problem
reduces to deciding how to split the shock rt between dt and xt.T h u s , t h e C B
just needs to choose dt and xt every period given the value of rt to minimize
5(2.7) subject to (2.3), (2.4) and the exchange regime which restricts the policies
available to the CB.
In what follows, any of the exchange rate regimes can be characterized by the
triple {λ,w,α}.T h e ﬁrst element is related to the preferences. The number w
is the band width. The last term α is the probability that the CB defends the
currency when it is outside the band and measures the credibility of the exchange
regime. This triple will adopt particular values for any of the exchange regimes
considered.
2.2. The ﬁxed exchange rate
Consider ﬁrst a CB that can credibly commit to ﬁx the exchange rate to ct = c.
This regime appears as a particular case of the target zone when w =0a n dα =1 .
Given the forward looking restriction of (2.3) and the pure random walk exhibited
by rt,t h es o l u t i o nf o rdt and xt is
dt = rt and xt = c. (2.8)
That is, under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime the nominal interest rate absorbs the


















The variability of the interest rate is a source of time inconsistency. If the
CB can commit to a rule like (2.8), it must exhibit a stronger response to the
risk premium shock in an attempt to cont e n tt h ee x c h a n g er a t ea tt h ec e n t r a l
parity. However, there arises the possibility of deviating from this simple rule in
order to reduce interest rate variability. If this temptation is captured by market
participants, the simple rule will no longer be credible. Hence, (2.8) would be
time inconsistent.
2.3. The managed ﬂoat
This regime is a particular case of the target zone when {λ > 0,w→∞ ,α =1 }.
The solution is related to a managed or dirty ﬂoating rate where the CB exploits
the trade-oﬀ between the variability of the exchange rate and the interest rate
every period. After the shock rt is realized and agents have formed their expec-
tations on future values for the exchange rate, the CB must set the two target
6variables {dt+τ,x t+τ}
∞
τ=0 with one instrument {mt+τ}
∞
τ=0, to minimize the loss
(2.7) subject to the arbitrage condition (2.3) and the relation in (2.4). Notice the
exchange regime does not impose additional restrictions.
The optimality condition is given by the diﬀerence equation






Et {xt+1 − xt}. (2.10)
The central parity is constant here since, with an inﬁnitely-wide band, there will
be no realignments. Forward iteration yields









It is useful to compare expression (2.11) to (2.6): the optimal exchange rate is
equal to the central parity plus the present discounted value of the future stream of
foreign risk premia which is the only fundamental shock that aﬀects the exchange
rate. From (2.4), a linear closed form solution of (2.11) is




The discretionary rate is then equal to the ﬁxed rate plus a depreciation bias.
Forming a one-period ahead expectation yields




so, from (2.3), the target variable dt is
dt = rt. (2.14)
A shock to the risk premium impulses exchange and interest rates in the same
direction. Combining (2.12) and (2.14), a linear control condition is given by
dt = λ(xt − c), (2.15)
meaning that the interest rate diﬀerential is proportional to the depreciation (or
appreciation) bias with respect to the central parity. This is just a leaning against
the wind policy, where the interest rate diﬀerential is positive when the currency
is above the target and negative below. Under the uncovered interest rate parity,
7conditional on xt, the risk premium has a positive relation with dt. Similarly,
conditional on dt, rt has also a positive relation with xt. Therefore, a central bank
that is concerned about the volatility of interest rate diﬀerentials and of exchange
rates will optimally split the variation of rt between dt and xt.T h i sr e s u l t si na
regime of intra-marginal interventions or managed ﬂoat. The higher the value of
λ, the smaller the variance for the exchange rate is.
The explicit form for the expected value of the game under the discretionary


















It is straightforward to see that the previous ﬁxed rate regime is a ﬁrst best. There
is no trade-oﬀ between the exchange rate and the interest rate. The attempt of
the CB in giving the interest rate a lower volatility by trading with the exchange
rate variance is a vain eﬀort. It results in a discretionary time consistent solution,
w h e r et h ev o l a t i l i t yo ft h ei n t e r e s tr a t ei su n a ﬀected and the exchange rate begins
to ﬂoat. The CB is worse oﬀ.
Finally, once the target variables have been determined, equation (2.5) gives
us the optimal level for the monetary instrument. From (2.5), the CB will expand
or absorb mt, according to
mt = c +( 1+γλ)
rt
λ
− θt . (2.17)
2.4. The pure free ﬂoat
Consider now the case where the CB announces that the risk premium shocks will
not be dampened over the exchange rate, whatever the preference parameter λ is.
That means
xt = c + rt. (2.18)
This is a laissez faire solution. The slope of the exchange rate function with
respect to the fundamental is one. According to the UIP (2.3), the interest rate
diﬀerential is again given by
dt = xt − c = rt.
Is it a time consistent result? As with the ﬁxed rate, the CB is not deciding
its monetary policy rule to optimize (2.7) and this may be a source of time in-
consistency. The result in this regime, depends on the value of λ, though. For
8the particular case λ =1 ,f r e ea n dm a n a g e dﬂoat solutions are identical and
consistency over time is therefore preserved. However, for values of λ 6=1 ,t h e
market will perceive that CB’s incentives to trade volatility of the exchange rate
for volatility of the interest rate are diﬀerent than 1 and the announcement of
the free ﬂoat will be no longer credible. Notice, that the relevant regime to be
compared with the target zone is the managed ﬂoat.

















The relation between the values for the ﬁxed, the managed and the free ﬂoat rates,





for any rt, see expressions (2.9), (2.16) and (2.19), respectively. Diﬀerences among
regimes will have to be found in the exchange rate dynamics since they imply the
same process for the interest rate diﬀerential. Clearly, the ﬁxed rate is preferred
over the two other regimes, although it is time inconsistent. The ordering of the
losses for the free ﬂoat and the managed ﬂoat will depend upon the value of λ
with respect to 1. If λ < 1, the CB is better oﬀ with the free ﬂoat. Otherwise,
for λ ≥ 1, managed ﬂoat is a better regime.
2.5. The target zone
In this case, the regime is characterized by {λ ≥ 0,w≥ 0,α ∈ [0,1]}.T h e ﬁrst
element is related to the preferences in (2.7). The number w is the band width.
The last term α is the probability that the CB defends the currency when it
is outside the band and measures the credibility of the exchange regime. We
suppose that, within the bands, the CB defends the currency with probability 1.
As stated in the introduction, the purpose is to construct a model able to generate
a consistent target zone solution, in the sense that the CB ﬁnds it optimal to
defend the target zone at the margins by probability α. There are not further
incentives to renege from the target zone ex-post.
From the previous discussion, both the exchange rate and the interest rate
diﬀerential will be functions of the shock rt. So, the timing of events at any time
t will be as follows:
91. The shock rt is realized.
2 .I ft h er e a l i z a t i o no ft h es h o c km a k e st h ee x c h a n g er a t eb ew i t h i nt h et a r g e t
zone, the CB solves a minimization problem. The process is as follows:
• The central parity from last period is left unaltered: ct = ct−1.
• Forward looking agents form expectations Etxt+1.
• For given {Etxt+1,r t,c t},t h eC Bc h o o s e s{xt,d t} by minimizing the
loss (2.7) subject to the arbitrage condition (2.3), the relation in (2.4)
and the additional restriction imposed by the target zone system.
3. If for that value of the shock the exchange rate should be outside a band
[ct − w,ct + w], for instance, say it is above the upper limit ct + w,t h eC B
c a nd oa n yo ft w oa c t i o n s :
• It defends the currency with probability α. This means that the ex-
change rate is pegged at the edge of the band, xt = ct + w,a n dt h e
central parity is not altered, ct = ct−1.
• It realigns the currency with probability (1 − α). In this case, the
central bank devalues the central parity by µ ≥ w, i.e. ct = ct−1 + µ,
and situates the exchange rate at xt = ct.
4. Finally, for a given shock θt in the money demand equation (2.5), the CB
supplies the optimal quantity of money mt supporting the pair {xt,d t}.
To understand the way this economy works consider the following. Assume
the risk premium starts from r0 = 0. The CB can set the exchange rate at
x0 = 0 and a target zone of width w around c0 = 0. Because of the symmetry
of the forcing process, the interest rate diﬀerential is d0 =0 ,w h i c he q u a l st h e
target value for that variable. As time progresses, the risk premium wanders
around and the exchange rate moves away from its center c0 = 0. Given that the
exchange rate is a function of the shock rt, the foreign risk premium must also be
ﬂuctuating within a symmetric zone with center ρ0 =0 .T h i sz o n ei sd e n o t e da s
[ρ0 − r,ρ0 + r]. How far the exchange rate wanders from the center of its band
should be a function of the distance between the risk premium and ρ0.S o ,f o rt h e
periods before the ﬁrst realignment, we could write
xt = c0 + u(rt − ρ0),
10where u(rt − ρ0) is the function linking the exchange rate to the fundamental
process rt within the band.
I m a g i n et h a ta tt i m et = τ, one of the limits of the exchange rate band is




When exchange rate is at the boundaries of the target zone, the CB could keep xt
at the edge of its band. In such a case, all movements in rt will be transferred to the
interest rate diﬀerential. The other possibility implies the central bank realigning
the target zone. In such a case, the exchange rate jumps to cτ = cτ−1+µ,a n dt h e
center of the band for the risk premium moves to ρτ = rτ. After the realignment
takes place, the behavior of the exchange rate band within the target zone is again
governed by the function u so we can write in general
xt = ct + u(rt − ρt).
Let x(rt) be the function relating the exchange rate to the risk premium at
any time, that is, within as well as outside the target zone. This function satisﬁes
x(rt)=ct

    
    
+µ if rt > ρt + r with probability 1 − α
+w if rt > ρt + r with probability α
+u(rt − ρt)i f rt ∈ [ρt − r,ρt + r]
−w if rt < ρt − r with probability α
−µ if rt < ρt − r with probability 1 − α.
(2.22)
The unknown continuous function u(rt − ρt) represents the CB’s best response
when the risk premium lies within its band [ρt − r,ρt + r]. To ﬁnd it, we use the
ﬁrst order condition for values of rt ∈ [ρt − r,ρt + r],
(1 + λ)[u(rt − ρt) − ct]=rt + Et [x(rt+1)]. (2.23)
Outside of the band, condition (2.23) does no longer hold and the trade-oﬀ is not
optimal. In order to ﬁnd out the particular form of the function u(rt − ρt), the
band for the fundamental [−r,r] must be computed, given the level conditions
(2.20) and (2.21). Forward recursion is used to solve for u(rt)w i t ht h eﬁrst
11order condition (2.23) subject to (2.22). Appendix A provides all the details for
computation of the solution.
From condition (2.23) and (2.3), it is straightforward to see that the model
produces a positive relation between the exchange rate of depreciation within the
band and the interest rate diﬀerential:
dt = λ[u(rt − ρt) − ct]+ρt, (2.24)
outside the bands, the trade-oﬀ is not optimal and expression (2.24) does not
hold.
3. Results
Before we start with the computations, let us ﬁrst remind the reader about the
implications derived from the main features of Krugman’s model: the honey moon
and the smooth pasting eﬀects (see Svensson [27] and Krugman and Miller [16]).
The ﬁrst means that the response of the exchange rate to changes in fundamentals
is smaller than the response under the free ﬂoating regime. That is, as compared to
af r e eﬂoating, the band works as an exchange rate stabilizer. The smooth pasting
implies that the response of the exchange rate tends to zero as it approaches the
edges of the band. This is because agents are forward looking and anticipate the
intervention by the central bank when the exchange rate gets close to the limit of
the band.
Svensson [27] has summarized the testable implications of Krugman’s model.
First, the distributions of both the exchange rate and the interest rate are U-
shaped. That is, the exchange rate tends to live close to the limits of the band.
Second, there is a negative and deterministic relation between the exchange rate
and the interest rate diﬀerential. This relation is given by the uncovered interest
rate parity. Finally, the exchange rate exhibits a non-linearity in its univariate
forecasting equation, which is a consequence of the smooth pasting eﬀect. How-
ever, empirical tests have challenged these predictions. The distribution of the
exchange rate has been observed to be hump-shaped rather than U-shaped, so the
exchange rate accumulates probability around the center of the band. Secondly,
t h er e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e nt h ee x c h a n g er a t ea n dt h ei n t e r e s tr a t ei sp o s i t i v er a t h e r
than negative. Finally, it seems that the eﬀects of the smooth pasting condition
are not as relevant as predicted by theory and exchange rates are linear functions
of the fundamentals.
12In what follows we calibrate our model and compare its predictions with the
data. Furthermore, we compute the losses (2.7) under diﬀerent regimes and pro-
vide a rationale as of why target zones may be widely used as an exchange rate
system.
3.1. Parameters
The following values for the parameters are used in the numerical exercises of this
section. We think of a week as the time frequency. As in Svensson [29], the time
discount factor is set to β =0 .90
1
52. We use this value to ease the calculations
but the main results of the paper do not hinge on it.
The selection of a standard deviation for the shock to the risk premium, σ,i sa
troublesome task. Bekaert [2] reports an unconditional variance for a time invari-
ant risk premium of 10.6222, for the Dollar/Yen rate. This ﬁgure yields a weekly
standard deviation of about σ =0 .002 basis points per week. Unfortunately,
we have not found an estimation of a time varying risk premium governed by a
random walk structure, as assumed throughout this paper. As an approximation,
we have used the ARCH-in-mean estimation by Domowitz and Hakkio [7], for
monthly observations 1973:6-1982:8, of the British Pound, the French Franc, the
Deustche Mark, the Japanese Yen and the Swiss Franc, all against the US Dollar.
A Montecarlo simulation has been run in order to calculate this moment. Table
1 reports the standard deviations for a ﬁrst diﬀerence of rt. The Swiss Franc
presents a time invariant risk premium. Hence, it seems reasonable to assume an
a priori value σ =0 .002, as in Bekaert [2].
Two bands are chosen, w = ±2.25% and ±6.00%, the widths experienced in
the ERM. The value of the constant µ is estimated depending on the band width
w. Tables 2 collects data of realignment rates for the currencies participating in
the ERM of the EMS, except for the Dutch Guilder. From this table it seems that
realignment rates of ±4.5% and ±6.3% for widths of ±2.25 and ±6%, respectively,
are consistent with the EMS history
Since there is no prior for the relative weight of the exchange rate variability
in the preferences of the CB, we use a wide range of values within which the
parameter λ is thought to be about. These values are λ =0 .2, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0a n d
5.0.
Tables 1 and 2 about here
133.2. Nonlinearities in the exchange rate function
Let us start examining the degree of nonlinearities in the exchange rate function
predicted by our model.2 Figures 1 to 3 plot the function u(rt) for probabilities of
defense α =0 ,1
2, and 1, together with the managed ﬂoat and the free ﬂoat. The
three ﬁgures diﬀer on the value of λ which are 0.5, 1, and 2, respectively. The 45
degree line corresponds to the free ﬂoat. The other linear solution is the managed
ﬂoat. We can see that the relative slopes of these two solutions depend on the
value of λ. Among the nonlinear solutions, the ﬂattest function corresponds to
α = 1, the target zone regime under perfect credibility. On the other extreme,
the most sloping curve corresponds to the case where the currency is realigned for
sure at margins, that is, α = 0. We can see that the degree of nonlinearity of the
target zone solutions to be very small. Furthermore, as the value of λ increases,
the target zone solutions get closer to the managed ﬂoat which is the relevant
regime to be compared with. This later result is independent of the credibility of
the target zone.
We also observe that the slope of the function u(rt) changes with r and this
change depends on the value of α. To make this result clearer, Figure 4 plots
u0 (rt)f o rλ = 1 and for values of α equal to 0, 1
4, 1
2, 3
4 and 1. First, we see that for
α smaller than 3
4, the slope tends to increase as the exchange rate approaches the
limits of its band and we obtain the inverted S-curve as in Bertola and Caballero
[4]. The opposite occurs when α is above 3
4. However, even in the fully credible
case, the slope does not reach zero at the edges, that is, there is no smooth
pasting condition. Violation of smooth pasting in the standard model implied a
discontinuity jump in the expected rate of depreciation function. In our model,
continuity of functions u(rt)a n dEtxt+1 is preserved under the level condition
u(r)=w, and the former arbitrage arguments do not apply here (see Appendix
2The empirical literature ﬁnds that the eﬀects of the non-linearities from the smooth pasting
condition are not as much important as predicted. See, for example, Meese and Rose [21] for
three alternative regimes, the ±1% band of the Bretton Woods system, the gold standard for
the British Pound, the French Franc and the Deustche Mark (versus the US Dollar), and third,
the EMS regime for the Dutch Guilder and the French Franc cases (versus the Deustche Mark).
The null hypothesis of non linearities is rejected for the three regimes. Lewis [18] runs a variety
of tests for the G-3 case (US, Germany and Japan) in order to check for possible non linearities
arising from implicit target bands and from the intervention policy. In all the cases, the exchange
rate seemed to be a linear function of the estimated fundamentals. Evidence on rejection of this
hypothesis is also reported in Lindberg and S¨ oderlind [19] for Swedish data. Flood, Rose and
Mathieson [9] do not either ﬁnd relevant evidence of the smooth pasting for three alternative
methods (graphical examination, parametric tests and forecasting analysis).
14B for a detailed explanation justifying this non smooth pasting result).
F i g u r e s1 ,2 ,3 ,4a b o u th e r e
3.3. U-shaped versus hump-shaped distributions
In the standard model, the U-shaped distribution is implied by the perfect cred-
ibility assumption. Since the exchange rate function ﬂattens near the edges, a
considerable mass of probability will be concentrated at the margins. However,
the empirical literature has pointed out that the distribution of the exchange rate
is hump-shaped rather than U-shaped.3
Figures 5, 6 and 7 plot the ergodic probabilities of diﬀerent depreciation rates
within the band for λ = 2 and for three diﬀerent values of α:1 ,0 . 8a n d0 .A s
suggested before, ﬁgure 5 shows that for the particular case of α = 1, the exchange
rate distribution displays a U-shaped distribution. On the contrary, ﬁgures 6 and
7 show that for α diﬀerent than 1, the distribution is hump-shaped. This occurs
even for values of α close to 1. The explanation is twofold. The ﬁrst reason is
related to the value of α.F o r l o w v a l u e s o f α, continuous realignments move
the exchange rate to new central parities, that is, to new centers of new bands.
Additionally, lack of credibility implies that the slope of exchange rate function
i n c r e a s e sa tm a r g i n s ,a sw eh a v es h o w ni nt h ep r e v i o u ss u b s e c t i o n .T h u s ,s t a b i l i t y
is higher around the centers. This helps to accumulate probability mass at the
interior of the bands. The second reason has to do with the value of λ.I f t h i s
parameter is high, the central bank will have incentives to further stabilize the
exchange rate.
F i g u r e s5 ,6 ,7h e r e
3See, for example, Bertola and Caballero [4] for the French Franc against the Deustche
Mark exchange rate case during 1979-87; and Lindberg and S¨ oderlind [19], [20], for the Swedish
unilateral target zone with a vast set of daily data covering from 1982 to 90. The work of Flood,
Rose and Mathieson [9] also ﬁnds hump-shaped histograms for EMS exchange rates. They use
daily data for eight EMS currencies and the British Pound (during its pre EMS membership)
over 1979-90, weekly data from the classical gold standard (UK, US, France and Germany), and
monthly data from the Bretton Woods regime.
153.4. The relation between exchange rates and the interest rate diﬀer-
entials
Empirical observations have shown the existence of a positive relationship between
t h ee x c h a n g er a t ea n dt h ei n t e r e s tr a t ed i ﬀerential.4 Bertola and Svensson [5]
suggest that incorporating a realignment risk premium may alter the sign of the
covariance between these two variables from negative to positive.
In our model, this relation has always a positive sign, regardless the value of
the parameters. This is a consequence of intramarginal interventions, summarized
by the ﬁrst order condition (2.15). Both the interest rate and the exchange rate
are driven by the same variable, namely, the risk premium. The central bank
decides at each period how to distribute the shock on rt between xt and dt.E x -
pression (2.15) tells us that it is always optimal to move both variables on the
same direction with λ being the ratio between the two. This gives rise to a posi-
tive linear relationship between the two variables. Hence, the honey moon eﬀect
is also transmitted to the interest rate smoothing.
3.5. On the choice of a target zone regime
In this subsection, we estimate the loss functions for the four regimes using the set
of parameters early stated. Losses for the ﬁxed rate, the managed ﬂoat and the
free ﬂoat are given by expressions (2.9), (2.16) and (2.19). The target zone loss is
numerically computed. We consider a starting point r0 = 0, and a time horizon of
2000 periods. This time length accumulates a 91.2% from the total accruing value
and does not alter the ordinality of values for the exchange regimes. Calculations
of the indirect costs are reported in table 3 for w = ±2.25% and table 4 for
w = ±6 % .I ne a c ht a b l e ,t h eﬁrst row refers to the cost of the ﬁx e dr a t er e g i m e ,




4, and 1, respectively. The seventh and eighth rows collect the managed
ﬂoat costs, Jmf,a n dt h efree ﬂoat costs, Jff. From these tables we highlight the
following results.
First, as it was mentioned above, the ﬁxed rate is the regime with the lowest
v a l u ef o rt h el o s sf u n c t i o n .
Second, with respect to the target zone regime, the closer α is to 1, the smaller
the losses are. This represents the gain from credibility of commitment to a zone.
The slopes of both the exchange rate function and the interest rate diﬀerential
4See Svensson [26], Flood, Rose and Mathieson [9], Lindberg and S¨ oderlind [19], and Bertola
and Caballero [4].
16ﬂatten for α approaching to 1. When market traders perceive that the CB will
defend the zone with a high probability, the realignment risk will be low and the
exchange rate responses to changes in the foreign risk premium will be soft. In
turn, this perception will contribute to smooth the expected rate of depreciation.
Hence, the outcome is that the interest rate diﬀerential will be more stable as
well.
Third, for target zones very close to being credible (α close to 1), the present
value of the costs of a target zone are smaller than the costs of a managed ﬂoat.
Notice that, unlike the previous literature that used the free ﬂoating as an alter-
native, the right regime to be compared with is the managed ﬂoat. As with the
second result, forward looking agents help stabilize the rate without pressuring
the interest rate, due to the honey moon eﬀect.
To make this point clearer, ﬁgures 8, 9 and 10 represent the contributions to
the loss functions due to the variability of the exchange rate and the interest rate
for all the regimes and values of λ equal to 0.5, 1, and 2, respectively. The circle
corresponds to the ﬁxed rate, the square to the managed ﬂoat and the triangles
are the target zones for diﬀerent values of α. It is clear that there must be an
interval for α close to 1 that reduces the volatility of both the exchange rate and
the interest rate with respect to the managed ﬂoat.
Table 4 and 5 here
Figures 8, 9 and 10 here
4. Conclusions
This paper presents a target zone model based on two extensions of Krugman’s
[15] model. These extensions are the introduction of intramarginal interventions
and the lack of credibility of the target zone. These two features had been ana-
lyzed separately by the literature. Here, we show that both extensions are needed
to reconcile the model with the data. The leaning against the wind policy derived
from the time-consistent intramarginal intervention produces a positive relation
between exchange rates and interest rates diﬀerentials as we observe in the data
as well as is behind the almost linear relation between exchange rates and fun-
damentals. Furthermore, lack of credibility is responsible for the hump-shape
distribution of exchange rates.
As a second application, the model provides a framework in which to evaluate
why target zones seem to be the dominant exchange rate regime in contemporary
17history. First, we argue that target zones should be compared with the managed
ﬂoat which is the other time consistent exchange arrangement. For this compar-
ison, we show that even not perfectly credible target zones may improve with
respect to the managed ﬂoat in terms of reducing simultaneously the volatility of
both exchange rates and interest rates diﬀerentials. In this way, we operationalize
the common view that target zones are preferred because they reap the beneﬁts
of both ﬂexible and ﬁxed exchange rates, by stabilizing the exchange rate without
loosing monetary independence. These two beneﬁts are explicitely included in the
model and are a result of the interaction between the preferences of the central
bank and the credibility of its monetary policy.
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A. Solution of the Target Zone
In this appendix we show how to make the computations for the solution of the
target zone regime. Forward recursion in the ﬁrst order condition (2.23) is used
to solve for u(rt) subject to (2.22). Let the expected rate of depreciation out of
the band be given by


























where the sequence Fτ≥0 represents ﬁltered information sets of the next form:
F0 = {rt}, (A.2)
Fτ≥1 = {{rt+n ∈ [−r,r]}
τ
n=1 ,r t}. (A.3)
21On the other hand, the components in (A.1) are given by:










































This general solution is consistent with (2.23) and (2.22). In order to determine
a particular solution, it is necessary to identify the value of r for which u(r)=w.
A.1. A numerical approximation
The general solution (A.1) involves a collection of integrals where only (A.4) and
(A.5) enjoy an explicit form. Numerical solutions are requested for the remaining
ones. Here, we propose a method that discretizes variable rt on K values (K ≥ 3
odd) within the interval [−r,r]a s
r = r1,r 2,...,rK, (A.9)
r1 = −r,
rk = rk−1 + h, (A.10)




22Let P, Q, R, S and T be row vectors (1 × K), adopting the following form
P1 = Φ
µ


























r − h/2 − rt
σ
¶
with rt given and











































for k =1 ,2,...,K, and
T = αwQ+( 1− α)S, (A.16)
where φ and Φ represent, respectively, the Gaussian pdf and cdf.





















































This implies that the value of the integrals at t+2 is determined for any possible
mean at t+1,rt+1 ∈ [−r,r], and any of these means is weighted by a probability
P, given a starting value rt at t.
The loop becomes harder as the period ahead increases over three. In order
to solve this problem, we develope a backward recursion algorithm, for which the
last period integral is ﬁr s t l ys o l v e da n dt h e np r o c e e db a c k w a r du pt ot h eﬁrst one.
Thereby, consider the following non negative matrix M ∈ RK×K
M1,l = Φ
µ































for k,l =1 ,2,...K, with the following properties: the sum over each column gives







φ(s|rl)ds ∈ (0,1) (A.17)
for l =1 ,2,...,K. The proof follows. This property is suﬃcient to verify the
Hawkins-Simon condition (Brauer-Solow Theorem).
Matrix M contains the transition probabilities in the intermediate periods
from τ up to τ + 1, within the interval [−r,r] and for any mean belonging to





Again, the value of the integrals are ﬁrst determined at t + 3 for any possible
mean at t +2 ,rt+2 ∈ [−r,r], given by the columns of M. The vector P closes
the calculation for any possible mean at t +1 ,rt+1 ∈ [−r,r], for given a starting
value rt.




E [rt+τ |Fτ ]=RM
τ−2P
0.
























Let the vector of eigenvalues be given by η(M), and call η∗ (M)t h eF r o b e n i u s
root, i.e. the maximum eigenvalue. From (A.17) we know that mc (l) < 1, this
is a suﬃcient condition to verify the Hawkins-Simon condition (see Brauer-Solow
Theorem). In turn, veriﬁcation of the Hawkins-Simon condition implies that
η∗ (M) < 1, (see Hawkins and Simon [14] and [13]). Then, matrix (I − M)
−1
















[(1 + λ)I − M]
−1 .
































or using the previous approximation
Etxt+1 = Ω(rt)+( 1+λ)∆(rt) − rt. (A.20)
Once we know the expression for the exchange rate and the expectation, the
interest rates diﬀerential is obtained from the uncovered interest parity condition
as
dt = Ω(rt)+( 1+λ)∆(rt) − xt (A.21)
B. Smooth Pasting Revised
In this appendix we show how the smooth pasting condition does not have to hold
in this model. Consider a center ρt = 0 and parity c = 0. First of all, by use of
(2.22) one can compute the one period ahead exchange rate expectation as













where φ(rt+1|rt) represents the Gaussian density of rt+1 given the current level
rt. The last term in this expression determines the expected exchange rate within
the band, under an optimal trade-oﬀ.
26A second order expansion of u(rt+1)a r o u n dav a l u eo frt ∈ [−r,r], gives
u(rt+1) ' u(rt)+u




00 (rt)(rt+1 − rt)
2 + o(rt+1). (B.2)























which represents the probability the risk premium wanders between [−r,r]f o r
the next period, given the present level rt, and function S1 (rt;r)r e p r e s e n t st h e
expected change of the risk premium:
S1 (rt;r)=p













= p(rt;r)E [(rt+1 − rt)|rt+1 ∈ [−r,r],r t].



























2 |rt+1 ∈ [−r,r],r t
¤
.
Functions (B.4), (B.5) and (B.6) are all continuous, a property that will result
relevant to deal with the smooth pasting argument.
27Plugging expressions (B.3) and (B.1) into the ﬁrst order condition (2.23), for
rt ∈ [−r,r]o n eo b t a i n s
















Now, we will approximate the particular solutions for the extreme case α =1 .
Under perfect credibility, this model does not exhibit the S-shaped of the standard
model. Let us ﬁrst brieﬂy remember the foundation of why the standard model is
zero sloped at the edges and, later, see how the smooth pasting condition should
be reinterpreted within our model5.
In the standard model, the exchange rate depends linearly of the fundamen-
tal and the expected rate of depreciation. The fundamental follows a regulated
Brownian motion such that, at margins, monetary policy push it back inside the
band. If the slope of the exchange rate function were strictly positive at these
edges, the expected rate of depreciation would display a discontinuity. Hence, a
sure jump would be given towards the interior of the band, and would provide
safe bets opportunities against the movement of the exchange rate. Therefore,
in order to avoid such a discontinuity jump, arbitrage considerations require that
the slope must be zero at margins.
In our model, expectations are given to the CB and the exchange rate is de-
termined from the ﬁrst order condition (2.23), subject to (2.22) and the level
conditions (2.20) and (2.21). The risk premium rt is a suﬃcient statistic to deter-
mine the position of the exchange rate inside the band. The CB cannot govern
this process and must ensure the equilibrium in the money market given in (2.1)
by responding to variations in fundamental. Continuity of functions x(rt)a n d
Et [xt+1]i sn o ta ﬀected, no matter the value of slope u0 (r).
The aforementioned argument can be developed by proving the continuity of
5The argument provided in this appendix widely follows that of Froot & Obstfeld [11].
28the expectations function for α =1 :







This is a sum of continuous functions deﬁned for any rt ∈ R, and therefore function
Et [xt+1] is also continuous. The expected conditional increase, S1 (rt;r), and
the conditional variability S2 (rt;r), are continuous as well, even when rt = ±r.
Continuity is then exhibited by the expectation. Analogously, the expected rate
of depreciation
Etxt+1 − xt,





+w if rt > r
u(rt)i f rt ∈ [−r,r]
−w if rt < −r
, (B.9)
and u(r)=w, u(−r)=−w. The smooth pasting condition is not needed for
continuity.
29C. Tables and Figures
Table 1








Realignment rates in the ERM6
Date FF IRP BF DK ITL SP PE
24-Sep-1979 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 2.00
30-Nov-1979 0.14 5.00
23-Mar-1981 -0.14 6.38
5-Oct-1981 8.76 5.50 5.50 5.50 8.76
22-Feb-1982 9.29 3.09
14-Jun-1982 10.61 4.25 4.25 4.25 7.20
21-Mar-1983 8.20 9.33 3.94 2.93 8.20
25-Jul-1985 8.51
6-Apr-1986 6.19 3.00 1.98 1.98 3.00
2-Aug-1986 8.70






Average 6.46 5.86 3.10 3.84 5.54 6.78 6.67
std 3.39 3.41 3.01 1.26 2.42 1.75 0.40
6In this table, FF stands for French Franc, IRP for Irish Punt, BF for Belgium Franc, DK for
Danish Krona, ITL for Italian Lira, SP for Spanish Peseta and PE for Portuguese escudo. The
ITL participated in the narrow ±2.25% band from 12th-January-1987 until 14th-September-
1992, when it left the ERM.
30Table 3
Loss function for w =0 .0225
λ 0.20 .51 .02 .05 .0
Jc 0.4444 0.4444 0.4444 0.4444 0.4444















3.0643 3.0624 2.0009 1.1846 0.5864
Jtz (α = 1) 0.4655 0.4919 0.5207 0.5430 0.5244
Jmf 2.6665 1.3333 0.8888 0.6666 0.5333
Jff 0.5333 0.6666 0.8888 1.3333 2.6665
Table 4
Loss function for w =0 .06
λ 0.20 .51 .02 .05 .0
Jc 0.4444 0.4444 0.4444 0.4444 0.4444















1.6704 1.1951 0.9102 0.6544 0.5333
Jtz (α = 1 ) 0 . 5 7 6 10 . 6 7 7 80 . 7 1 0 60 . 6 4 8 70 . 5 3 3 3
Jmf 2.6665 1.3333 0.8888 0.6666 0.5333












































free and managed float
α = 0
Function u[r] (l = 1)






















Function u[r] (l = 2)













































































































































0,4682 0,4684 0,4686 0,4688 0,4690 0,4692 0,4694 0,4696 0,4698 0,4700
d
x

















0,467 0,468 0,469 0,470 0,471 0,472 0,473 0,474 0,475 0,476
d
x



















0,4680 0,4685 0,4690 0,4695 0,4700 0,4705 0,4710 0,4715 0,4720 0,4725
d
x
Contributions to the costs (l = 1)
α = 1
α = 0.75
α = 0.5
α = 0.25
α = 0
Managed float
Fixed rate